meisam zandigoharrizi; Lotfollah Nabavi
Abstract
Future Contingency has been an old debate between philosophers throughout history. On one hand, Aristotle thinks events of the future happen contingently. On the other hand, Diodorus believes what happens in the future is now determined. Diodorus has presented an argument for determinism based on a few ...
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Future Contingency has been an old debate between philosophers throughout history. On one hand, Aristotle thinks events of the future happen contingently. On the other hand, Diodorus believes what happens in the future is now determined. Diodorus has presented an argument for determinism based on a few premises. Logicians and philosophers try to avoid determinism by denying the first premise of Diodorus, which is the necessity of the past. However, they only regard a qualified version of this premise based on the medieval argument for determinism while some other philosophers consider this premise in a general way. A new argument shall be presented in this paper for determinism similar to the medieval one based on the general version of the premise which is not rejected by systems which reject the medieval argument. This flaw originates in a few properties of the branching model for time. We shall show what this property is and how it would be possible to resolve the problem this property creates.
Zahra Zargar; Ebrahim Azadegan; Lotfollah Nabavi
Abstract
Inconsistency of methodological naturalism and religious beliefs has been the most important reason for theists to oppose methodological naturalism. But some philosophers defend methodological naturalism based on their theological dispositions. They believe that theological motivations can lead to a ...
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Inconsistency of methodological naturalism and religious beliefs has been the most important reason for theists to oppose methodological naturalism. But some philosophers defend methodological naturalism based on their theological dispositions. They believe that theological motivations can lead to a naturalistic methodology. In this paper we review and criticize two prominent types of these arguments and show their deficiencies: First we review arguments which concentrate on difficulties of “Divine Action” problem. According to them rejecting methodological naturalism leads to God of Gaps theology which is awkward and non-religious. Secondly we discuss arguments which aim to prove that supernatural entities could not be described via limited scientific method. The main claim of these arguments is that supernatural entities are too transcendent to be referred in a scientific theory.
lotfollah nabavi; mojtaba amir khanlu; mohammad ali hojati
Abstract
First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, ...
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First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, nemed to broad logical necessity, is a kind of logical necessity. By this definition of metaphysical necessity, the relation between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility is partial-general-and-specific. Third, on the one hand we’ll critique the modal generalism in which our intuitive perception of modality will be refuted and on the other hand, some accounts of modal particularism like Possibilism and Haecceitism are confronted with some kind of Ungroundedness. Next, we’ll present a new account of modal particularism. In this new account, the concept of “being a possible world”, as a modal concept, is counted as Primitive concept. With the help of this new account and the concept Conceiving, we’ll present a new definition of Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility. At last, we shall show that in this new definition, the relation between epistemic and metaphysical possibility is absolute-general-and-specific.
lotfollah nabavi; mojtaba amir khanluo
Abstract
Actualism is an ontological thesis according to which the domain of existent objects and the domain of actual ones are the same. According to this thesis, we do not need to commit to any non-actual objects for solving any philosophical problems. The approach of Bernard Linsky, Edward N. Zalta and Michael ...
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Actualism is an ontological thesis according to which the domain of existent objects and the domain of actual ones are the same. According to this thesis, we do not need to commit to any non-actual objects for solving any philosophical problems. The approach of Bernard Linsky, Edward N. Zalta and Michael Nelson is one of the current approaches to the actualism which is known as “New Actualism”. They offer a new presupposition about existent objects according to which a concrete object is in fact contingently concrete object and a non-concrete object, if not be (unlike the number 11) an abstract one is (like the Masaya’s child) contingently non-concrete object. So, by supposing contingently non-concrete objects, they can present a model with fixed domain and not-world-restricted quantifiers which can validate formulas like Barcan Formula, Conversion of Barcan Formula, Necessary Existence and Iterated Modality and offer a suitable explanation for intuitions which support the formula of Possibility of Aliens. However, some critics like Karen Bennett believe that in this approach, some non-actual entities have enumerated as actual objects and consequently New Actualism is a kind of Proxy Actualism. In this article, by adopting an opponent position to Karen Bennett’s one, we try to describe New Actualism and some criticisms about it and to show that New Actualism is not a kind of Proxy Actualism.
litfolah nobavi
lotfollah nabavi
Abstract
One ef the most important innovations in the history ef traditional logic is the Avicena's Theory ef Temporal Modalities (.ATM). Althottgh) the basic concepts and elements ef this theory are fottnded in Aristotelian and Stoic-lvlegarian !0 gic) but as a independent lo,gical system, are devised on/y fry ...
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One ef the most important innovations in the history ef traditional logic is the Avicena's Theory ef Temporal Modalities (.ATM). Althottgh) the basic concepts and elements ef this theory are fottnded in Aristotelian and Stoic-lvlegarian !0 gic) but as a independent lo,gical system, are devised on/y fry Avicenna and were later developed and completed fry his followers. The ATM theory contains the h(ghest de._gree of logical complexiry in the allperiods of the traditional lo,gic. In this article) with a historical and comparative approach, we s!ttcfy the theory of temporal modalities(.A TM) based on the logical heritage o] Avicenna and later logicians in such a ivqy that 1ve can sbou! their relation 1vith modern logical concepts
